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1 Introduction
This note illustrates a novel strategic use of the option of not allocating. It has been well known since
Myerson (1981) that in order to maximize revenues, the optimal mechanism may require the seller
to retain the object. In a setting with externalities, Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996) have
shown that the seller may be better off not selling at all. In the bargaining literature, it is known
that the option of value destruction can be strategically exploited to improve the buyer’s bargaining
position; see for instance Dasgupta and Maskin (2007). A common feature of the above papers is
that not allocating, or voluntary destroying value, are instruments used by one of the participants in
the mechanism to increase his/her own surplus at the expense of that of some other party. Instead,
we point out that not allocating can be a tool to increase expected social surplus. This work is part
of our research agenda on second best efficiency; see our companion papers Hernando-Veciana and
Michelucci (2011), and Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2013). Our approach differs from most
of the literature on efficient auctions, which focuses on environments where the first best allocation
is feasible; see Maskin (2003) for a review. From a technical point of view, we adapt the ironing
techniques introduced by Myerson (1981) to characterize the second best allocation.
2 The Model
One unit of an indivisible good is put up for sale to a set of 2 potential buyers. The seller’s value is
assumed to be zero. Let s = (s1, s2) ∈ R2 be a vector where si corresponds to the realization of an
independent random variable with distribution Fi and with a strictly positive density in a bounded
support Si ⊂ R. Buyer i ∈ 1, 2 privately observes si and gains a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
vi(s)− p if she gets the good for sale at price p, and utility −p if she does not get the good and pays
a price p. We assume that vi(s) = si + αsj , for any i ∈ {1, 2}, where α > 1. To further simplify the
notation, we assume that F is a Uniform distribution, and Si = [0, 1]. The restriction to α > 1 is
commented upon the next section.
3 Feasible Allocations and First Best Efficiency
We are interested in the set of allocations that can be implemented. According to the revelation
principle, there is no loss of generality when restricting to direct mechanisms. A direct mechanism is a
pair of measurable functions (p, x), where p is an allocation and x : S → R2 a payment function. Let
2
an allocation be a measurable function p : S → [0, 1]2, where S ≡ ∏i∈{1,2} Si, ∑i∈{1,2} pi(s) ≤ 1, and
where pi(s) denotes the probability that the good is allocated to i when the vector of types is s ∈ S.
We say that an allocation p is feasible if a direct mechanism (p, x) exists that satisfies the following
Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint: Ui(si, si) = sups′i∈Si{Ui(si, s′i)}, for all si ∈ Si and any i,
where,
Ui(si, s
′
i) ≡
∫
Sj
(
vi(s)pi(s
′
i, sj)− xi(s′i, sj)
)
dsj .
Lemma 1. An allocation p is feasible if and only if Qi(si, p) ≡
∫
Sj
pi(si, sj)dsj is weakly increasing
in si, ∀i.
Proof. See Myerson (1981). 
We rewrite vi(s) in a way that is convenient for the second best analysis: vi(s) = α(si+sj)+hi(si),
where hi(si) ≡ −(α− 1)si.1
Definition: We say that an allocation p is first best efficient when it satisfies for any s ∈ S that∑2
i=1 pi(s) = 1, and pi(s) > 0 only if hi(si) = max{hj(sj)}2j=1.
4 Second Best Efficiency and the Optimality of Not Allocating
In our environment the unique symmetric equilibrium of standard auctions (e.g. FPA, SPA, EA)
allocates the good to the buyer with highest type, who is the buyer with lowest value. Consequently,
standard auctions implement the allocation that induces the lowest expected surplus among the allo-
cations that always allocate the good to the one of the buyers.
Definition: We say that an allocation p is second best efficient if it is feasible and it maximizes∫
S
∑2
i=1 (α(s1 + s2) + hi(si)) pi(s) ds.
The first best allocation is not implementable because hi is decreasing.
2 We derive from the hi
functions some auxiliary functions that we call gi, which are non decreasing and determine the second
1From this way of rewriting the problem, it is also possible to appreciate that one can reinterpret the setting we
present as one where buyers share a common value α
∑
i∈N si for the object, and where buyer i imposes (when winning)
a negative externality on the other buyer equal to hi(si).
2The fact that the first best is not implementable is due to the assumption α > 1 that implies a violation of the single
crossing condition; see Maskin (1992), which is a necessary condition for the implementability of the first best.
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best allocation like the hi’s determine the first best. Let Hi(si) ≡
∫ si
0 hi(s˜i) ds˜i for any i and any si,
and let Gi(si) : [0, 1]→ R be the convex hull of the function Hi.3 Formally:
Gi(si) = min {wHi(r1) + (1− w)Hi(r2) : w, r1, r2 ∈ [0, 1] and wr1 + (1− w)r2 = si} .
Lemma 2. Properties of Gi (see Section 6 in Myerson (1981)):
(a) Gi is convex; (b) Gi(0) = Hi(0) and Gi(1) = Hi(1); (c) Gi(si) ≤ Hi(si) for all si ∈ [0, 1]; (d)
If Gi(si) < Hi(si) in an open interval, then Gi is linear in the same open interval.
As a convex function, Gi is differentiable except at countably many points, and its derivative is
a non-decreasing function. We define gi : [0, 1] → R as the differential of Gi, wherever it exists,
completed by right-continuity.
Lemma 3. A feasible allocation p∗ is second best efficient if and only if it maximizes:4
∫
S
2∑
i=1
(α(s1 + s2) + gi(si)) pi(s) ds+
n∑
i=1
∫
Si
(Gi(si)−Hi(si)) Qi(dsi, p). (1)
See the proof in the Appendix.
Corollary 1. Suppose that there exists5 a feasible allocation p∗ that satisfies:
(i) p∗i (s) > 0 only if gi(si) = max{gj(sj)}j∈N and α(s1 + s2) ≥ −gi(si).
(ii) Qi(., p
∗) is constant in any open interval in which Gi(si) < Hi(si).
Then, a feasible allocation p is second best if and only if p = p∗ a.e.
Condition (i) and (ii) are necessary and sufficient conditions for the maximization of the first and
second integral in Equation (1), respectively. The former is straightforward and the latter follows from
the application of Lemma 2(c) since it implies that the second integral is non-positive and that (ii) is
a necessary and sufficient condition for the second integral to be equal to zero.
3That is the highest convex function on [0, 1] such that Gi(si) ≤ Hi(si) for all si ∈ [0, 1]. See also Rockafellar (1970),
Page 36.
4We denote by
∫
E
ϕ(x)F (dx) the Lebesgue-Stieljes integral of ϕ with respect to F in E. In particular, for any feasible
allocation p, we denote by
∫
Si
ϕ(si)Qi(dsi, p) the Lebesgue-Stieljes integral of ϕ with respect to Qi(., p) in Si.
5That such p∗ exists under our assumptions is shown below. However, this is not true under other alternative
assumptions in which Corollary 1 still applies. This is the case of v1(s1, s2) = s1 + 2s2 +  and v2(s1, s2) = s2 + 2s1
for  > 0 and small, and s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1]. In this example, Corollary 1 implies that p∗(s) = (0, 0) if s1 + s2 < 14 − 2 ,
and p∗(s) = (1, 0), otherwise. But such p∗ does not satisfy Corollary 1(ii). To see why, note that Q1(s1, p∗) is strictly
increasing in s1 ∈
(
0, 1
4
− 
2
)
and one can argue as in the proof of Proposition 1 that G1(s1) < H1(s1) for any s1 ∈ (0, 1).
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Proposition 1. The following symmetric allocation rule is feasible, and maximizes the expected social
surplus:
• If s1 + s2 ≤ (α−1)2α , then p1(s1, s2) = p2(s1, s2) = 0.
• If s1, s2 > (α−1)2α , or if s1, s2 < (α−1)2α and s1 + s2 > (α−1)2α , then p1(s1, s2) = p2(s1, s2) = 12 .
• If s1 ≤ (α−1)2α and s2 ≥ (α−1)2α , then p1(s1, s2) = 7α
2+2α−1
8α(α+1) − αα+1s1 and p2(s1, s2) = 1− p1(s1, s2).
• If s1 ≥ (α−1)2α and s2 ≤ (α−1)2α , then p2(s1, s2) = 7α
2+2α−1
8α(α+1) − αα+1s2 and p1(s1, s2) = 1− p2(s1, s2).
Proof. The allocation is feasible by application of Lemma 1 because Qi(si, p) =
7α2+2α−1
16α2
for si ∈ [0, 1]
and i ∈ {1, 2}. To finish the proof, we check that the allocation also satisfies the conditions in
Corollary 1. That hi(si) = −(α− 1)si implies that gi(si) = −α−12 . Thus, condition (i) is equivalent to
p1(s)+p2(s) > 0 if and only if s1+s2 ≥ (α−1)2α , which is satisfied by the proposed allocation. Condition
(ii) is also satisfied because Qi(si, p) =
7α2+2α−1
16α2
for any i and any si, which is constant in si. 
Figure 1 illustrates the second best allocation for α = 2.6 We can easily compare this allocation to
an allocation that maximizes expected surplus subject to always selling, i.e. p1(s) + p2(s) = 1 for all
s ∈ S. One example of the latter is the uniformly random allocation that assigns the good with equal
probability to either buyers (independently of their report).7 Switching from the uniformly random
allocation to the second best allocation increases the expected social surplus because the efficiency
loss of not allocating the good to any buyer in the triangle is small relative to the efficiency gain that
can be achieved in the rectangle areas.
Corollary 2. No standard auction with an entry fee or a reserve price implements the second best.
Corollary 2 is a direct consequence of Corollary 1(i) because {(s1, s2) : α(s1 + s2) < −gi(si)} is
a triangular subset of the space of types since gi(si) =
α−1
2 , and there is no equilibrium of standard
6Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (2013) applies our insights on the structure of the second best when
α = 2 to show that Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms can provide strictly larger expected surplus than any ex
post incentive compatible mechanism in a model with two types.
7To see why, note that the uniformly random allocation maximizes both integrals in Equation (1) under the constraint
that p1(s) + p2(s) = 1 for any s ∈ S. This can be deduced from the fact that p1(s) + p2(s) = 1 implies that the first
integral in Equation (1) is constant and equal to α − α−1
2
, since gi(si) = −α−12 , and the second integral is zero for the
uniformly random allocation, and as we have already explained, the second integral never takes a strictly positive value
because of Lemma 2(c).
5
-6
@
@
@
@
@
@
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
(0, 0)
0
0.25
1
s2
0.25 1
s1
(
17
48 +
2
3s2,
31
48 − 23s2
)
(
31
48 − 23s1,
17
48 +
2
3s1
) (1
2 ,
1
2
)
Figure 1: Second best allocation (p1(s), p2(s)) for α = 2, i.e. vi(si, sj) = si + 2sj
auctions with entry fees or reserve prices in which the set of types that do not participate is triangular.
Note that this would require the participation decision of one buyer to be conditional on the type of
another buyer, which is not a feasible strategy in a standard auction.
5 Conclusions
We provide a novel rationale for a seller/social planner to credibly commit to retain the object.
Interestingly, reserve price and entry fees are not helpful in implementing the most efficient allocation
because they are not conditional on the type (or bid) of all the buyers.
6
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The second best maximizes:∫
S
2∑
i=1
vi(s)pi(s) ds =
∫
S
2∑
i=1
(α(s1 + s2) + hi(si)) pi(s) ds. (2)
Moreover, note that:∫
S
(hi(si)− gi(si)) pi(s)ds =
∫ 1
0
(hi(si)− gi(si))Qi(si, p) dsi =∫ 1
0
Qi(si, p)Hi(dsi)−
∫ 1
0
Qi(si, p)Gi(dsi) =
−
∫ 1
0
(Hi(si)−Gi(si)) Qi(dsi, p).
where we use the definition of Qi and Si in the first step, in the second step, H
′
i(si) = hi(si) and
G′i(si) = gi(si) a.e., and in the third step, integration by parts and Lemma 2(b).
Consequently, the expressions in Equation (2) are equal to the expression in Equation (1) as
desired.

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